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Abstract This lecture is the story of an intellectual
journey, that of elaborating a new—Schumpeterian—
theory of economic growth. A theorywhere (i) growth is
generated by innovative entrepreneurs; (ii) entrepre-
neurial investments respond to incentives that are them-
selves shaped by economic policies and institutions; (iii)
new innovations replace old technologies: in other
words, growth involves creative destruction and there-
fore involves a permanent conflict between incumbents
and new entrants. First, we motivate and then lay out the
Schumpeterian paradigm and point to a set of empirical
predictions which distinguish this paradigm from other
growth models. Second, we raise four debates on which
the Schumpeterian approach sheds new light: the middle
income trap, secular stagnation, the recent rise in top
income inequality, and firm dynamics. Third and last,
we show how the paradigm can be used to think (or
rethink) about growth policy design.
Keywords Entrepreneurship . Creative destruction .
R&D . Entry . Exit . Competition . Technology frontier .
Firm dynamics
JEL classification O10 . O11 . O12 . O30 . O31 . O33 .
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1 Introduction
This lecture is the story of an intellectual journey, which
Peter Howitt and I initiated almost 30 years ago when
we decided to elaborate a new theory, now known as the
BSchumpeterian theory,^ of economic growth. It is a
theory where (i) growth is generated by innovative
entrepreneurs; (ii) entrepreneurial investments respond
to incentives that are themselves shaped by economic
policies and institutions; and (iii) new innovations re-
place old technologies: in other words, growth involves
creative destruction and therefore involves a permanent
conflict between incumbents and new entrants. In this
essay, we try to explain why and how to start up with the
ambition of transforming growth theory, but eventually
it was us who ended up being transformed. In particular,
it explains how we started as pure applied theorists and
ended up doing theory differently, through a constant
back and forth between theory and data and a permanent
dialog with empiricists themselves working with firm-
level data.
It is this story of the double transformation of the
object and the subject which I want to tell during this
lecture.
The remaining part of my presentation will be orga-
nized as follows. First, I will ask the question: why a
new theory of economic growth? What did we find
unsatisfactory with the dominant theory at the time, both
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theoretically and empirically? Second, I will lay out the
Schumpeterian paradigm; I will point to a set of empir-
ical predictions which distinguish this paradigm from
other growth models, and I will tell you the story of how
we started to dialog and then collaborate with
microeconometricians. Third, I will raise four growth
enigmas or debates on which the Schumpeterian ap-
proach sheds new light: the middle income trap, secular
stagnation, the recent rise in top income inequality, and
firm dynamics. Fourth and last, I will show how the
paradigm can be used to think (or rethink) about growth
policy design.
2 Why did we need a new theory of economic
growth?
During my student years, the dominant paradigm in
growth economics was the neoclassical growth model,
which would be taught first under the assumption of a
constant savings rate (the Solow model) and then in the
context of an economy where a representative consumer
decides about consumption, savings, and investment by
maximizing her intertemporal utility (the Ramsey-Cass-
Koopmans model).
The Solow model is the true template in growth
economics, like Modigliani-Miller is the benchmark in
corporate finance. This is first due to its being amodel of
elegance and parsimoniousness: the whole dynamics of
the economy is described in two equations. The second
reason is that the model shows very clearly why there
can be no long run growth without technical progress.
The model was published in 1956 (I was born that same
year) and was rewarded by the Nobel Prize in 1987.
I will not bother you here with the details of this
model which economists all know too well. But in a
nutshell, the model describes an economy where final
output is produced using capital as input, and where
therefore it is the accumulation of capital that generates
output growth. This corresponds to the first equation of
the model. Then, the question is where does capital
accumulation come from? This in turn is answered with
the second equation of the model: capital accumulation
comes from savings (aggregate savings equal aggregate
investment in equilibrium), and savings – in turn – are in
the Solow model are a constant fraction of final output,
i.e., of aggregate GDP.
You might think that everything should go well in
such an economy: more capital stock financed by savings
will produce more final output, which will translate into
more savings (as savings are proportional to final output)
and therefore in still more capital stock and so on.
The problem is that we run into decreasing returns
when trying to increase output by increasing the capital
stock: the higher the existing stock of capital (number of
machines), the lower the marginal increase in output
from increasing the stock of capital by one unit (i.e.,
from adding one more machine). Thus, the lower the
increase in savings, the lower the induced increase in
capital stock.
At somemoment, the process of capital accumulation
runs out of steam (it stops when capital depreciation
catches up with marginal savings) at which point the
economy stops growing. To generate sustained long-
term economic growth, there must be continuous tech-
nical progress to increase the quality (productivity) of
machines. But, Solow does not tell us where technical
progress is coming from.
In addition, if the model predicts conditional conver-
gence, it does not give us the tools to understand why
some countries converge to the standards of living (per
capita GDP) of developed countries whereas other
countries do not converge, or why some countries with
lower capital stocks grow less rapidly than do other
countries with higher capital stocks, or why capital does
not necessarily flow from rich to poor countries (the so-
called Lucas Paradox).
More fundamentally, the model does not look at
growth from the point of view of firms and entrepre-
neurs, in which economic environment or Bbusiness
climate^ (institutions, policies) is more likely to stimu-
late innovation and entrepreneurship?
These motivated us to elaborate a new paradigm.
3 The Schumpeterian paradigm
In the fall of 1987 with Peter Howitt, we elaborated a
growth model revolving around three important ideas
outlaid by the Austrian economist Joseph Schumpeter
(Aghion and Howitt 1992).
First idea: long-run growth is primarily generated by
innovations (this is the natural counterpart of Solow’s
conclusion that no long-run growth can be expected
without sustained technological progress).
Second idea: innovations result from entrepreneurial
investments (R&D, training, computer purchase, etc.)
and entrepreneurs respond to the economic incentives
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(positive or negative) which result from economic pol-
icies and economic institutions. Thus typically,
innovation-based growth will be discouraged in envi-
ronments with poor property right protection or with
hyperinflation as these will damage the profitability
from innovation. In other words, innovation-based
growth is a social process and we can talk about policies
of growth and institutions of growth.
Third idea: creative destruction. New innovations
replace old technologies, and Schumpeterian growth is
a conflicting process between the old and the new: it
tells the story of all these incumbent firms and interests
which permanently try to prevent or delay the entry of
new competitors in their sector. Hence, there is some-
thing called Bthe political economy of growth.^
A distinct prediction of the Schumpeterian growth
model is that firm or job turnover should be positively
correlated with productivity growth. Another distinctive
implication of the model is that innovation-led growth
may be excessive under laissez-faire. Growth is exces-
sive (resp. insufficient) under laissez-faire when the
business-stealing effect associated with creative destruc-
tion dominates (resp. is dominated by) the intertemporal
knowledge spillovers from current to future innovators.
4 Growth meets IO and our dialog with empiricists
After an initial period of excitement with this new
paradigm, some empirical studies came out which tem-
pered our enthusiasm.
In particular, Blundell et al. (1995, 1999)―using UK
firm-level data—raised doubt on another prediction of
our model: the prediction that more competition should
be detrimental to growth by reducing monopoly rents
from innovation and thus entrepreneurs’ incentives to
invest in innovation in the first place as shown in Fig. 1
(incidentally, this latter argument has been used by Bill
Gates when facing anti-trust action). Instead, when
performing a linear regression of firms’ innovation in-
tensity and/or productivity growth on the degree of
product market competition in the firms’ sectors,
Blundell et al. and Nickell found a positive correlation
between competition and innovation/growth, as shown
in Fig. 2.
How, if at all, could we reconcile theory and evi-
dence? Should we throw the model in the garbage bin
and start again from scratch? Or should we simply
ignore the empirical challenges and proceed as before?
We went for a third way, namely, to look more
closely at the model and try to identify the assumption
or assumptions which generate this counterfactual pre-
diction of a negative relationship between competition
and growth.
And, we finally identified the culprit: in our initial
model, only currently inactive firms innovate, not the
currently active firms (i.e., not the current technological
leaders). Thus, an innovating firm in our model would
move from zero profit (pre-innovation) to a positive
profit (post-innovation). Then, it is no wonder why
competition would discourage innovation: competition
reduces the post-innovation profit which here is equal to
the net profit from innovation.
However, in reality, one finds at least two types of
firms in most sectors of the economy and these two
types of firms do not react in the same way to increased
competition. You first have what we call Bfrontier
firms,^ i.e., firms that are close to the current technolog-
ical frontier in their sector. These firms are currently
active and they make substantial profits even before
innovating this period. Second, you have what we call
the Blaggard firms,^ i.e., firms far below the current
technological frontier. These firms make low profits
and try to catch up with the current technology frontier.
To try and understand why these two types of firms
react differently to competition, imagine for a moment
that what you are looking at are not firms but students in
a classroom. And among them, you have the top stu-
dents and the bottom of the class. And, suppose that you
are opening the class to an additional student who turns
out to be a very good student. This is how I represent an
increase in competition in this context. How will the
students react to this new student joining the classroom?
The answer (here I refer to important work by Caroline
Hoxby who studied precisely this) is that letting the new
student in will encourage the other top students to work
harder in order to remain the best, whereas it will further
discourage students at the bottom of the class, as those
will find it even harder to catch up.
Quite strikingly, firms react like classroom students:
faced with a higher degree of competition in their sector,
firms that are close to the technology frontier will inno-
vate more in order to escape competition, whereas firms
that are far from the technological frontier and try to
catch up will be discouraged by the higher degree of
competition and as a result innovate less: these latter
firms behave like in the basic Schumpeterian model (see
Fig. 3).
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Overall, the effect of competition on innovation and
productivity growth is an inverted U, as shown in Fig. 4,
which synthetizes the positive escape competition effect
and the negative discouragement effect. The prediction
of opposite reactions of frontier versus non-frontier
firms to competition, and of an inverted U overall, was
tested and confirmed in joint work with Richard
Blundell, Nick Bloom, and Rachel Griffith using the
same kind of firm-level data as in the empirical studies I
mentioned above.
In the end, this exercise has been mutually enriching.
On the one hand, our empirical colleagues realized that
the relationship between competition and growth was
more involved and subtle than what they thought based
on their initial studies. On the other hand, we understood
how to enrich our model so as to bring out not one but
two basic effects of competition on innovation and
growth, to identify conditions under which one or the
other effect dominates and why when aggregating
across all firms/sectors we obtain an inverted U relation-
ship, as anticipated by Scherer (1967).
To reconcile theory with evidence, we extended our
basic Schumpeterianmodel by allowing for step-by-step
innovation in the Schumpeterian growth model (see
Aghion et al. 1997, 2001). Namely, a firm that is cur-
rently behind the technological leader in the same sector
or industry must catch up with the leader before becom-
ing a leader itself. This step-by-step assumption implies
that firms in some sectors will be neck-and-neck. In
turn, in such sectors, increased product market compe-
tition, by making life more difficult for neck-and-neck
firms, will encourage them to innovate in order to ac-
quire a lead over their rival in the sector. This we refer to
as the escape competition effect. On the other hand, in
unleveled sectors where firms are not neck-and-neck,
increased product market competition will tend to dis-
courage innovation by laggard firms as it decreases the
short-run extra profit from catching up with the leader.
Fig. 1 Competition and growth:
theoretical prediction
Fig. 2 Competition and growth:
empirical relationship
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This we call the Schumpeterian effect. Finally, the
steady-state fraction of neck-and-neck sectors will itself
depend upon the innovation intensities in neck-and-
neck versus unleveled sectors. This we refer to as the
composition effect.
This extendedmodel predicts that in the aggregate, the
relationship between competition and innovation should
follow an inverted U pattern. Intuitively, when competi-
tion is low, innovation intensity is low in neck-and-neck
sectors, therefore most sectors in the economy are neck-
and-neck (the composition effect); but precisely, it is in
those sectors that the escape competition effect domi-
nates. Thus, overall aggregate innovation increases with
competition at low levels of competition. When compe-
tition is high, innovation intensity is high in neck-and-
neck sectors; therefore, most sectors in the economy are
unleveled sectors, so that the Schumpeterian effect dom-
inates overall. This inverted U prediction is confirmed by
Aghion et al. (2005), using panel data on UK firms.
The prediction that more intense competition en-
hances innovation in Bfrontier^ firms but may discour-
age it in Bnon-frontier^ firms was tested by Aghion et al.
(2009a) using again panel data of UK firms.
Another prediction from our extended model is that
there is complementarity between patent protection and
product market competition in fostering innovation. In-
tuitively, competition reduces the profit flow of non-
innovating neck-and-neck firms, whereas patent protec-
tion is likely to enhance the profit flow of an innovating
neck-and-neck firm. Both contribute to raising the net
profit gain of an innovating neck-and-neck firm; in other
words, both types of policies tend to enhance the escape
competition effect.
That competition and patent protection should be
complementary in enhancing growth rather than mutu-
ally exclusive is at odds with both, our first model and
Romer (1990), where competition is always detrimental
to innovation and growth (as we discussed above) for
exactly the same reason that intellectual property rights
(IPRs) in the form of patent protection are good for
innovation: competition reduces post-innovation rents
whereas patent protection increases these rents. But, it is
also at odds with Boldrin and Levine (2008) who hold
that patent protection is always detrimental to innova-
tion and growth in their model where competition is
good for growth.
Our prediction of a complementarity between
competition and patent protection was tested by
Aghion et al. (2013) using OECD country-industry
panel data.
Fig. 3 Competition, growth, and
distance to frontier
Fig. 4 Competition and growth:
the inverted U relationship
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5 Four growth enigmas
This established dialog between Schumpeterian growth
theory and firm-based empirical analysis has generated
progress in approaching a number of growth enigmas.
Here, I will limit myself to four growth enigmas: (i) the
middle-income trap, (ii) secular stagnation, (iii) the dy-
namics of inequality, and (iv) firm dynamics. And, in
each case, I will suggest policy implications.
5.1 The middle income trap
In 1890, Argentina enjoyed a GDP per capita approxi-
mately 40 % that of the USA, which made it a middle-
income country. This level was three times the GDP per
capita of Brazil and Colombia and equivalent to that of
Japan at the time. Argentina sustained this level of 40 %
of the GDP per capita of the USA through the 1930s. To
be precise, Chow’s test (a statistical test) shows a break
around 1938 (Fig. 5), after which Argentina’s produc-
tivity declines relative to American productivity by ap-
proximately 21% per year. What explains this drop-off?
Schumpeterian growth theory offers the following
explanation. Countries like Argentina either had institu-
tions or had implemented policies (in particular import-
substitution) that fostered growth by accumulation of
capital and economic catch-up. They did not, however,
adapt their institutions to enable them to become inno-
vating economies. As demonstrated in joint work with
Daron Acemoglu and Fabrizio Zilibotti, the greater the
level of development in a country—i.e., the closer it gets
to the technology frontier—the greater the role of
cutting edge innovation as the motor of growth, replac-
ing accumulation and technological catch-up
(Acemoglu et al. 2006).
This phenomenon also exists in Asia. Japan, where
the state has always tightly controlled competition, is
another example: Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade,
and Industry (MITI) caps the number of import permits,
and the state subsidizes investment by the big industrial-
financial consortia known a keiretsu. It is thus not sur-
prising that from an extremely high level between 1945
and 1985—the envy of other developed countries—
Japan’s growth has fallen to a very low level since 1985.
In our previous discussion, we mentioned some re-
cent evidence for the prediction that competition and
free-entry should be more growth-enhancing in more
frontier firms, which implies that they should be more
growth-enhancing in more advanced countries since
those have a larger proportion of frontier firms. Similar-
ly, Acemoglu et al. (2006) show, using a cross-country
panel of more than 100 countries over the 1960–2000
period, the following:
1. Average growth should decrease more rapidly as a
country approaches the world frontier when open-
ness is low.
2. High entry barriers become increasingly detrimental
to growth as the country approaches the frontier.
These two empirical exercises point to the impor-
tance of interacting institutions or policies with techno-
logical variables in growth regressions: openness is
particularly growth-enhancing in countries that are
Fig. 5 Argentinian versus USA per capita GDP
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closer to the technological frontier; entry is more
growth-enhancing in countries or sectors that are closer
to the technological frontier.
Similarly, to the extent that frontier innovation makes
greater use of research education than imitation, the
prediction is that the more frontier an economy is, the
more growth in this economy relies on research educa-
tion. Aghion et al. (2009b) showed that research-type
education is always more growth-enhancing in US
states that are more frontier, whereas a bigger emphasis
on 2-year colleges is more growth-enhancing in US
states that are farther below the productivity frontier.
5.2 The debate on Bsecular stagnation^
In 1938, economist Alvin Hansen explained in his Pres-
idential Address before the American Economic Asso-
ciation that in his opinion, the USA faced inexorable
weak growth in the long term (Hansen 1939). The
nation was just emerging from the Great Depression,
and Hansen did not anticipate another World War that
would stimulate a rebound in public spending and there-
by of aggregate demand.
Since then, we have experienced another major fi-
nancial crisis, the 2007 crisis, which led Larry Summers
and others to revive the expression Bsecular stagnation^
to characterize a situation that they assimilated to the
one described by Hansen in 1938 (Summers 2013).
Summers’s argument is that investment demand was
so weak that negative interest rates were necessary for
a return to full employment.
Robert Gordon however believes that the risk of
secular stagnation reflects a supply problem (Gordon
2012). Gordon proposes that the age of great innova-
tions is past. He uses the metaphor of a fruit tree: the
low-hanging fruit is the best; after that, the fruit is harder
to pick and less juicy.
By way of example, the arrival of the Boeing 707 on
the market in 1958 marked the end of progress in
duration of air travel time. Until then, travel time had
decreased exponentially; since then, not only has travel
time ceased to decrease, it has actually increased due to
the conjugated effects of energy saving and cost
optimization.
Schumpeterian economists are more optimistic about
the future than Summers and Gordon were. A first
argument (Jorgenson) is that the revolution in informa-
tion and communications technologies (ICT) has radi-
cally and durably improved IT-producing technology;
meanwhile, globalization (which was concomitant with
the ICT revolution) substantially increased the potential
returns on innovation—the scale effect—as well as the
potential downside of not innovating—the competition
effect.
A second argument against the secular stagnation
view is that we have witnessed an acceleration in inno-
vation over the last several decades, which has been
fully reflected by measured productivity growth.
In particular, Aghion et al. (2016) argue that innova-
tion involving creative destruction is not properly taken
into account by current measures of TFP growth.When-
ever old products in the PPI are replaced by new prod-
ucts by new entrants, the statistical office often uses the
price changes of surviving products to infer the price
change of the replaced products.
Using the Schumpeterian growth paradigm to pro-
vide explicit expressions for missing growth from crea-
tive destruction, they estimate missing growth from
creative destruction to lie between 0.4 and 0.8 percent-
age point on average per year.
The following figures help motivate this idea that
creative destruction partly explains missing growth.
In Fig. 6, the number of patents correlates positively
with productivity growth in American states where there
is little creative destruction, but not in states experienc-
ing creative destruction. Similarly, the correlation be-
tween the production of patents and productivity growth
is more positive in America in sectors with little creative
destruction (Fig. 7).
Finally, Fig. 8 depicts the relationship between the
level of creative destruction in a sector at a particular
time on the one hand and the correlation between TFP
growth and the annual flow of patents on the other.More
precisely, (i) each year over the period from 1994 to
2010, we rank 16 sectors, spanning the whole
manufacturing industry, according to their level of cre-
ative destruction. Here, creative destruction is measured
by half the sum of job creation and job destruction rates
from the Quarterly Workforce Indicators series from the
Census (see Davis et al. 1996); (ii) for any value x on the
horizontal axis, we group all the sector-years with level
x on the creative destruction scale, and compute the
corresponding within-group average correlation y(x) be-
tween current yearly TFP growth and the current yearly
number of patents.
Then, we see that the correlation between TFP
growth and patenting over time is lower in sectors with
higher rates of creative destruction.
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Third and last: my optimism regarding future growth
prospects is also based on the observation that many
countries have taken only belated and incomplete ad-
vantage of technological advances, e.g., because of
structural rigidities or inappropriate economic policies.
These countries did not adapt and therefore did not
evolve from a catch-up economy to an innovation econ-
omy. The comparison between Sweden and Japan, as
shown in the two graphs in Fig. 9a, b, is highly infor-
mative: growth of productivity accelerated in Sweden as
it declined in Japan.
5.3 Innovation, inequality, and social mobility
Over recent decades, developed nations have experi-
enced an accelerated increase in income inequality, es-
pecially at the top tier, with the top 1 % capturing a
rapidly growing share of total income (Atkinson et al.
2011; Piketty 2013). What explains this evolution?
Figure 10 compares the evolution of innovation in
the USA since 1960 (as measured by the number of
patents registered annually with the US Patent and
Trademark Office), with extreme inequality (as mea-
sured by the share of income attributed to the top 1 %
of earners). The similarity in the two curves (innovation
and the top 1 % share of income) is striking.
A new study by Antonin Bergeaud, Richard
Blundell, Ufuk Akcigit, David Hemous, and myself
(Aghion et al. 2015) shows that this strong correlation
reflects a causal link between innovation and extreme
inequality: income from innovation contributes signifi-
cantly to the increase in the share of income going to the
top 1 %.
The observation that the observed increase in the top
1 % results in part from innovation, and not solely from
Fig. 7 Correlation between
patenting and labor productivity
growth
Fig. 6 Correlation between
patenting and labor productivity
growth
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returns from real estate and speculation, provides an
important insight, because innovation has virtues that
the other sources of high income do not necessarily
share.
First, as previously mentioned, innovation is the
main motor of growth in developed economies. Second,
although in the short term innovation benefits those who
generated or enabled the innovation, in the long term, its
returns are dissipated due to imitation and creative de-
struction. In other words, the inequality induced about
by innovation is temporary. Third, because of the link
between innovation and creative destruction, innovation
generates social mobility: it enables new talent to enter
the market and to displace (partially or totally) the firms
in place. Thus, in the USA, California—currently the
most innovating state of the union—far outpaces Ala-
bama—which is among the least innovating states—
both in terms of the inequality of income going to the
top 1 % and in terms of social mobility.
The two figures are especially eloquent. The first
figure (Fig. 11) describes the relationship between inno-
vation and social mobility by comparing American mu-
nicipalities. Social mobility is defined as the probability
that an individual from a modest background (i.e., one
whose parents were in the lowest quintile in the earnings
scale between 1996 and 2000) will reach the highest
quintile in 2010 upon reaching adulthood (based on the
Fig. 8 Creative destruction and
the correlation between TFP
growth and patenting
Fig. 9 Productivity growth: Sweden versus Japan
Fig. 10 The top 1 % income share and the annual patent flow in
the USA since 1960
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work of Chetty et al. 2014). Innovation is measured by
the number of patents filed with the US Patent and
Trademark Office per resident in the municipality. The
resulting graph shows a strong positive correlation be-
tween innovation and social mobility.
The second figure (Fig. 12) shows that there is no
correlation between innovation and the broader mea-
sures of inequality such as the Gini coefficient, which
measures the deviation between the actual distribution
of income within an economy and a perfectly equal
distribution.
By taking into account all of the pieces of the puzzle,
we can respond to the question of whether we should
object to innovation on the grounds that it contributes to
income inequality. The response is no, because innova-
tion generates growth. It does not increase inequality in
broader terms, rather it stimulates social mobility. As a
corollary to this discussion, tax policy must differentiate
between innovation and other sources of top income.
Put differently, we must distinguish between a Steve
Jobs and a Carlos Slim. Tax policy that discourages
innovation would not only inhibit growth but also re-
duce social mobility, whereas innovation does not in-
crease inequality measured broadly.
5.4 Firm dynamics
Again, using both, theory and empirical analysis, youn-
ger generations of scholars have developed the
Schumpeterian paradigm to look at the important ques-
tion of the relationship between growth, innovation, and
firm dynamics. Here, I should mention Daron
Acemoglu, Ufuk Akcigit, Nick Bloom, Chang Tai
Hsieh, William Kerr, Pete Klenow, Tor Jakob Klette,
and Samuel Kortum as prominent figures in this new
development.
The empirical literature on firm size distribution and
on firm dynamics had pointed to a number of interesting
stylized facts. In particular, (i) the firm size distribution
is highly skewed, as shown in Fig. 13; (ii) firm size and
firm age are highly correlated; and (iii) small firms exit
more frequently, but the ones that survive tend to grow
faster than do the average growth rate.
Incidentally, these are all facts that non-
Schumpeterian growth models could not explain. In-
deed, the first four facts required a new firm to enter,
expand, and then shrink over time and eventually be
replaced by new entrants: these and the last fact on the
importance of reallocation are all associated with the
Schumpeterian idea of creative destruction.
An important milestone to try and explain the above
facts and more generally the relationship between
growth, innovation, and firm dynamics was the
Schumpeterian model by Klette and Kortum (2004). In
this model, firms are defined as a collection of produc-
tion units where successful innovations by incumbents
will allow them to expand in product space (see Fig. 14).
Let us show why this paradigm allows us to explain
the above stylized facts. Consider first the prediction
that the size distribution of firms is highly skewed.
Recall that in this model, firm size is summarized by
the number of product lines of a firm. Hence, a firm
needs to have succeeded many attempts to innovate in
new lines and at the same survived many attempts by
potential entrants and other incumbents at taking over its
existing lines, in order to become a large firm. This in
turn explains why there are so few very large firms in
steady-state equilibrium, i.e., why firm size distribution
is highly skewed as shown in a vast empirical literature.
Consider now the prediction that firm size and firm
age are positively correlated. In the Klette-Kortummod-
el, firms are born with a size of 1. Subsequent successes
are required for firms to grow in size, which naturally
produces a positive correlation between size and age.
Fig. 11 Innovation and social mobility
Fig. 12 Innovation percentiles and the top 1 % and Gini99
inequality measures
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This regularity has been documented extensively in the
literature.
Now coming to the prediction that small firms exit
more frequently, and that the ones that survive tend to
grow faster than average, in the Klette-Kortum model, it
takes only one successful entry to make a one-product
firm to exit, whereas it takes two successful innovations
by potential entrants to make a two-product firm exit.
The facts that small firms exit more frequently and grow
faster conditional on survival have been widely docu-
mented in the literature.
6 Rethinking growth policy
Economists have responded in different ways to the
question of whether to get involved in economic policy
debates or rather to stay out of the debates and concen-
trate on basic research. My work lies between these
attitudes. Although I am first and foremost a researcher
and a teacher, I find economic policy debates compel-
ling for two reasons. First, as a strictly scientific matter,
analyzing public policy and action enables us to better
understand the mechanisms of growth. Second, theoret-
ical and empirical economic analysis combats Bfalse
good ideas^ by clarifying the terms of the policy debate.
6.1 Learning from economic policy
Public policy and active public intervention can be a
tool for econometric analysis of growth models, as
illustrated by the following two examples.
6.1.1 Reforms as a tool: competition and innovation/
growth
We looked earlier at the relationship between competi-
tion and innovation/growth. How can we be sure that
this relationship is causal and not a mere coincidental
correlation? The most commonly used method is that of
instrumental variables: we utilize a variable that has a
direct effect on competition and thereby on innovation
but no direct effect on innovation. In our work with
Richard Blundell and his team, we used the creation of
the European Single Market (CEE) and the deregulation
implemented by Margaret Thatcher as instrumental var-
iables to establish the causal nature of the relationship
Fig. 13 Firm size distribution
with multiproduct firms
Fig. 14 The firm as a collection of product lines
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between competition and innovation-induced growth in
the UK.
6.1.2 Cronyism as a tool: innovation-induced growth
and higher education
One of the policies that seem to foster growth in coun-
tries close to the technology frontier investment in
higher education, especially at the PhD level. Working
with Caroline Hoxby from Stanford University, we used
political cronyism to instrument for research education.
In the USA, Appropriation Committees in the Senate
and the House of Representatives have the power to
allocate federal resources to the states to help finance
their investments in infrastructure, schools, and univer-
sities and R&D.
Aghion et al. (2009b) show the evolution of expen-
ditures on higher education and research in three Amer-
ican states that are a priori at similar levels of develop-
ment: Alabama, Mississippi, and Georgia. We see that
the federal funds allocated to higher education and
research for Alabama increased sharply when the sena-
tor from this state, Lister Hill, took office as the Chair of
the Senate Appropriations Committee. This funding
clearly stimulated innovation in the state.
This data provides us with a good tool to analyze the
effect of expenditures in higher education and research
on innovation and growth in the USA.
With a small dose of irony, we could argue that even
if favoritism in politics is bad, it is a boon for econome-
tricians on the lookout for variables to isolate the causal
relationships that they seek to demonstrate. From this
point of view, France’s immoderate taste for experimen-
tation in taxation makes my country a first-class labora-
tory for analyzing the effect of various tax policies on
innovation and growth.
A more direct reason for a research economist to
study public policy is that they may influence thinking
on the subject. First, they can combat certain false truths
and faulty reasoning (Joan Robinson responded to the
question of why one should study economics, Bto pro-
tect yourself from economists^). Second, they can help
elucidate the terms of a very confused debate.
Two examples of false truths in growth policy are as
follows:
1. More industrial policy is necessary to achieve com-
petitiveness in an innovation economy.
2. Structural reform(s) and macroeconomic stimulus
are mutually exclusive.
6.2 Rethinking industrial policy in an innovation
economy
One of the pillars of the French Welfare State during the
post-war economic boom was its industrial policy,
which supported the large-state enterprises and subsi-
dized investment in a small number of large private
enterprises (the Bnational champions^).
As we have seen, innovation-induced growth re-
quires not only competition and low barriers to entry
but also the discontinuation of activities that have be-
come unprofitable. A Colbertist model of industrial
policy that concentrates on a few national champions
necessarily distorts competition and inhibits the entry of
new, innovating firms.
This argument led some economists and decision-
makers to call for the flat-out abandoning of any indus-
trial policy whatsoever, i.e., any sectorial targeting of
public investment. They recommended rather that gov-
ernments limit themselves to horizontal targets, such as
schools, universities, research, or SMEs.
Between a nostalgic attachment to Colbertism and an
absolute banishment of the slightest tendency in that
direction, there is room for a new type of industrial
policy, more favorable to competition and less biased
in favor of a small number of existing firms. For exam-
ple, recent research based on data from Chinese firms
shows that an industrial policy that focuses on more
competitive sectors (and not firms) and distributes sub-
sidies in a transparent and egalitarian fashion within a
sector, including new entrants, fosters growth and inno-
vation (Aghion et al. 2012).
Put briefly, the approach to industrial policy should
not be Byes or no^ but rather to seek a new form of
governance of industrial policy more compatible with
innovation-induced growth. I hope this goal will inspire
young generations of economists.
6.3 Structural reforms and proactive macroeconomic
policies
Faced with a recession, some economists support stim-
ulus policies (via public deficit and spending) and others
argue for disengagement of the state, except to ensure
well-functioning markets.
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Thus, to explain the resilience of the American econ-
omy compared to the European economy following the
crisis of 2007–2009, some blame the lack of macroeco-
nomic reactivity in Europe, while others point to the
delay, by France and other European nations, to imple-
ment necessary structural reforms.
I believe that these two factors played a simultaneous
and intertwined role: the persistent rigidities in the mar-
kets for goods and labor inhibited the impact of proac-
tive macroeconomic policy. This opinion echoes the
words of Mario Draghi, the Director of the European
Central Bank (ECB), who declared at Bretton Woods in
2013 that he could only do half the work by relaxing
monetary policy and that Member States would have to
do the other half by making reforms.
Preliminary results from a joint research with Gabriel
Chodorow and Emmanuel Farhi from Harvard Univer-
sity, and Enisse Kharroubi from the Bank for Interna-
tional Settlements, suggest that structural reforms and
countercyclical monetary policy (lower interest rates
during periods of recession and higher interest rates in
periods of expansion) actually complement each other.
In other words, by being more audacious with respect to
structural reforms, not only do we incite our economic
partners and the ECB to adopt more flexible macroeco-
nomic policies but more importantly we also increase
those reforms’ positive impact on growth.
6.4 How to reconcile the goals of growth and reducing
inequality
Researchers and policy-makers continually ask how
we can make growth more inclusive and less inegal-
itarian. Many of my colleagues have attempted to
analyze the correlation between income inequality
broadly measured and the rate of growth of the
GDP or the per capita GDP. These attempts, such as
those of Abhijit Banerjee and Esther Duflo, have
failed to show a clear relationship between inequality
and growth. I would argue that a more promising
approach is to (i) identify growth drivers in the econ-
omy being studied and (ii) analyze the effect of each
of these drivers on phenomena such as the various
measures of inequality: broad measures (such as the
Gini coefficient), the share of income going to the top
1 %, and social mobility. As we have seen, innova-
tion affects these measures in different ways.
In particular, my work with Gilbert Cette, Elie Co-
hen, and Jean Pisani-Ferry (Aghion et al. 2007) showed
that the main growth drivers for a developed economy
are education (especially higher education), competitive
markets for goods and services, and a dynamic labor
market. How do these drivers affect social mobility?
Education is Binclusive^ in that it tends to increase
social mobility and to reduce income inequality broadly
measured. Indeed, Chetty et al. (2014) show that social
mobility correlates positively with performance on edu-
cation tests.
More surprisingly, the flexibility of the labor market
and the market for goods seems to favor social mobility
(see Aghion and Roulet 2015).
These results are encouraging: the growth levers for
innovation also stimulate social mobility. In light of our
earlier remarks, we can state with certainty that using an
inappropriate tax policy to discourage innovation in-
hibits not only growth but also social mobility.
7 What’s next?
It is always treacherous to attempt to predict the next
major innovations and that is particularly true in the field
of growth economics. Nonetheless, we can already per-
ceive new fields of study emerging from the availability
of new databases. I will suggest two areas for future
research building on the Schumpeterian paradigm and
methodology.
7.1 Growth meets development
Michael Kremer, Abhijit Banerjee, and Esther Duflo
revolutionized development economics by introducing
experimental random methods of analysis drawn from
pharmaceutical science to evaluate the effectiveness of
newmedicines and vaccines (Banerjee and Duflo 2012).
Their work enabled us to understand better the behavior
of individuals and households in extreme poverty and to
see how they react to different policies of aid and
assistance.
But, firms play little role in these analyses and link
between micro and macro development is not spelled
out. However, one cannot disregard macroeconomic
and systemic factors, nor the effects of resource reallo-
cation, when the goal is to eradicate poverty at a national
or regional level.
To see why macroeconomics matters, for example,
the rate of poverty in urban zones of India (fraction of
the population living on less than $1 per day) fell from
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39 % in 1987–88 to 12 % in 1999–2000. Over the same
period, growth took off: from less than 0.8 % in the mid-
1980s, it climbed to 3.2 % in the 1990s. This upswing in
growth in India resulted less from local actions than
from systemic reforms such as the liberalization of trade
and of the market for goods and services, with the
suppression of the BRaj license^ (Aghion et al. 2008).
But, looking at the systemic and macroeconomic
aspects of a problem by no means implies we should
ignore the microeconomic aspects, in particular at the
level of the firm or sector. The two figures below, from
the work of Pete Klenow and Chang-Tai Hsieh, illustrate
this point (Klenow and Hsieh 2009). The first figure
(Fig. 15) compares the distribution of Indian firms by
productivity with the distribution of American firms.We
observe that there are many more firms with low pro-
ductivity in India than in the USA. The second figure
(Fig. 16) represents the evolution of the average size of a
company as a function of its age, in India, Mexico, and
the USA. It shows that American firms continue to grow
whereas the growth of Indian firms drops off.
Both of these figures look at microeconomic charac-
teristics. Yet, when placed side by side, they tell a story
that has consequences on the Indian economy as a
whole: the inability of Indian firms, even the most
innovative and productive ones, to grow beyond a cer-
tain size, enables firms with low productivity to survive.
But, in the aggregate, innovation and thereby the growth
of the Indian economy overall, suffers.
To explain these two figures, we must consider the
systemic characteristics of the Indian economy. As ex-
plained by Ufuk Akcigit, the limited growth of Indian
firms over time appears to be tied to the fact that the
majority of them remain family companies, which can
be explained by the low average level of education and
the resulting inadequate management skills, by defec-
tive infrastructure, and by the imperfections in the credit
market in India (Akcigit et al. 2014).
A better understanding of the process of growth of
firms and the reallocation of resources among firms or
sectors would undoubtedly provide new keys to under-
stand the relationship between growth and development
and to find lasting remedies for underdevelopment and
poverty in the world.
7.2 Becoming an inventor
New growth theories have shed light on the role of
institutions and policies in favoring or preventing
Fig. 15 Distribution of firms’ productivity
Fig. 16 Link between the age
and the size of firms
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innovation-led growth. However, these models typically
assume an economy with ex ante identical individuals
who freely decide whether or not to become innovators
and are indifferent in equilibrium between innovating
and working in manufacturing. In practice, not every-
body can become an innovator: whether one becomes
an innovator or not is likely to depend upon the social
environment (parental resources and education, the
individual’s own education, etc.) and upon innate
ability, both of which are unevenly distributed across
individuals. Moreover, individuals’ social mobility
is itself likely to be affected by whether or not the
individual innovates and in a way which may also
depend upon education, parental income education,
and innate ability.
Understanding the extent to which society pro-
vides equal opportunities ex ante and at the end
selects its most able citizens to become innovators,
and getting a better sense of the income dynamics of
innovators versus non-innovators is important for
assessing whether innovation-led growth is
Binclusive,^ i.e., does not exclude individuals based
on social origin and instead promotes social mobility.
Understanding these dynamics better should be help-
ful in designing institutions and policies that are more
growth-enhancing precisely because they achieve a
better selection of talents into innovation and provide
better incentives to innovators.
8 Conclusion
Numerous paths are yet to be explored to better under-
stand the enigmas of growth, the relationship between
growth and innovation, and the role of institutions and
economic policy in the process of development. Under-
standing this process will benefit not only science but
society as a whole, because we are less fearful of what
we understand.
Nearly 200 years ago, in 1835 in his book on De-
mocracy in America, Alexis de Tocqueville wrote: BI
cannot help fearing that men may reach a point where
they look on every new theory as a danger, every inno-
vation as a toilsome trouble, every social advance as a
first step toward revolution, and that they may absolute-
ly refuse to move at all for fear of being carried off their
feet.^ My hope is that the work we have undertaken
over the past 30 years and which I tried to summarize
will contribute to dispel this apprehension.
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